separation, and thus allows us to distinguish between cases where workers' stated reason agrees and disagrees with the assumption that all separations in a mass layoff are displacements. The central difficulty lies in how to interpret worker survey responses. Specifically, does the survey response represent the proximate or ultimate reason for separations? We interpret the proximate reason as being what the worker reports in the survey. Some separations reported as a quit, however, may have been caused by economic distress at the firm. For example, the worker might have searched for a job in anticipation of the layoff. In this case, the researcher would not want to take the survey response at face value and infer an error in the administrative data. Hence, we interpret the firm contraction to be the ultimate reason for separation if, in the absence of the contraction, the worker would not have separated.
This paper develops an approach to combine information in administrative and survey data to assess the magnitude of possible biases in the administrative data, while distinguishing between the proximate and ultimate reasons for separations in the survey data. The main idea is to compare the separation probabilities and earnings losses of workers reporting particular survey reasons at relatively stable firms (i.e., neither growing nor shrinking) to those at firms contracting by 30 percent or more. We interpret the difference in the separation probabilities and the composition-adjusted earnings losses as reflecting the causal role of the firm contracting on both the probability of separating as well as earnings losses.
Our approach provides estimates of the share of separations at firms that are contracting by 30 percent or more that are caused by the separation, which we refer to as latent displacements, as well as the earnings losses in the separations caused by the contraction. In terms of separations, when a firm contracts, only 55 percent of the survey responses indicate that the worker's proximate cause of separation was firm-level distress. Our approach finds, however, that much of this misalignment between survey and administrative measures represents workers reporting proximate rather than ultimate reasons for separations, so that about 85 percent of the separations were caused by the firm contraction. In terms of earnings losses, we uncover substantial heterogeneity in earnings losses depending on the alignment between survey and administrative data. Our estimate of the latent earnings losses of displaced workers, however, is quite similar to the estimate using administrative data alone. Thus, we conclude that the magnitude of the biases in administrative data measures of displacement are small.
We also use our link between survey and administrative data to revisit the treatment of earnings histories with zeros. A common practice in the displaced worker literature is to drop earnings histories with a sufficient number of zeros post-displacement. The reason is that in typical administrative datasets the researcher does not know whether the zeros are because of nonparticipation or unemployment. Our survey-administrative data link allows us to include only the zeros of workers who are unemployed and thus still looking for work. Including these zeros approximately doubles the magnitude of the persistent earnings losses.
The paper that is most similar to this one is von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth (2012) . They link the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) to California administrative data and assess the alignment between the survey data and the administrative data and see how earnings losses vary depending on the alignment. Our use of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) allows us to ask different questions than von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth (2012) can ask with the DWS. Specifically, workers only appear in the DWS if they report being displaced. There are thus two reasons why a worker might not appear in the DWS. First, a worker may have forgotten that they were displaced. Second, they might have remembered that they separated, but did not perceive it as a displacement. Because respondents are asked retrospectively about the last three years, what they remember about the event might depend on what subsequently happened to them. This saliency bias is precisely what von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth (2012) work hard to address. The SIPP has the benefit that workers are asked about separations that occur in the last quarter and so there is less concern about recall bias (in particular, recall that conditions on outcomes). In addition, SIPP respondents can report a reason for separating that is not displacement. This paper unfolds as follows. Section I describes our administrative and survey datasets and the procedure for linking them. Section II documents what workers say when the administrative data would label them as displaced and what the administrative data says when workers say they were displaced. Section III describes how we estimate earnings changes following a separation. It also shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in earnings changes conditional on a worker being displaced, depending on what reason the worker gives for separating. Section IV describes how we combine the information in (mis)alignment between the survey and administrative data to measure the earnings losses associated with the firm contracting. It also reports the results of implementing our method. Section V reports the results of including the zeros of workers still looking for work. Section VI concludes.
I. Survey and Administrative Data

A. Data Description
We use two datasets: the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the administrative Longitudinal Employer Household Dynamics (LEHD).
The SIPP is a US Census Bureau survey. It is a nationally representative series of panels with a sample size of between 14,000 and 36,000 households per panel. We use the 2001 and 2004 panels, which span the years 2000 to 2006. Each SIPP panel is conducted in waves and rotation groups, with each wave consisting of a four-month period during which an interviewer contacts a household. The sample is divided into four rotation groups, where one rotation group is interviewed each month. During the interview, the household is asked information about the previous four months.
The SIPP contains information on up to two jobs held by each person in the household, along with the starting and (potential) ending dates of those jobs. If a respondent identifies that a job has ended, they are prompted to identify the reason that the job has ended from a list of 14 possible answers (see Table 1 for the complete list). In addition, it provides information on labor force participation. Those identified as not working are asked to identify the reason.
The LEHD dataset is built from administrative unemployment insurance records.
1 It contains unique person identifiers that allow us to follow workers across employers. Similarly, it contains unique employer identifiers that allow us to follow employers over time and construct employer growth rates. The unit of analysis on the employer side is the state-level enterprise identification number (SEIN). While multiple establishments may have the same SEIN in a particular state, the definition of the enterprise does not cross state lines. 1 We have access to all 49 states (plus the District of Columbia) that participate in the LEHD program, and the data we have available runs through 2011. See Vilhuber (2008) for discussion of the background and contents of the LEHD files. Over 90 percent of payroll employment is covered by the unemployment insurance system. To align with the interest in the displaced worker literature in high-tenure workers, we look at SIPP jobs with at least 12 months of tenure. We then link a SIPP job that ends to an LEHD job on three features:
• The LEHD job has 4 consecutive quarters of positive earnings that exceed a minimal threshold (earning the minimum wage at 70 percent of full-time equivalent hours); • In the four quarters following the survey-reported separation, the worker has at most minimal earnings from the employer (earnings fall below the threshold defined in the previous bullet); 3 and • The LEHD job ends either in the quarter that the SIPP job is reported to end, or one quarter before or after the SIPP job is reported to have ended.
The first requirement means that both jobs meet a tenure threshold and are both plausibly full time. The second requirement attempts to capture permanent separations. The third requirement follows from our interest in comparing reasons for separations, rather than the reporting of separations. The window around the separation allows for the possibility that workers continue to receive paychecks after a separation. In cases where this procedure yielded more than one match we gave priority to the job with the highest earnings in the quarter prior to the separation. For linking continuing jobs (i.e., jobs that do not end) in the SIPP to the LEHD we follow a similar procedure to above, except that we do not impose the requirement that the job end.
Online Appendix B provides additional details on the criteria, as well as the resulting match rates. The main sample frame consists of person-quarters in the SIPP that have been matched to the LEHD. A given person might appear multiple times in the dataset. We impose two additional sample restrictions. First, we require that the worker be between the age of 25 to 74 in the calendar year of the observation. Second, we require that the employer have at least 50 workers three quarters prior to the candidate quarter (see Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for comparisons of our sample selection criteria to other studies).
One might worry that some of what we label as a mass layoff is simply that the employer ID has changed. In online Appendix C, we detail how we used employee flows to clean spurious shutdowns and other employer ID changes.
II. Alignment between Survey and Administrative Measures
The literature has used both administrative and survey measures to study displaced workers. Both measures present measurement challenges. On the one hand, the administrative measure might capture separations that are unrelated to economic distress. On the other hand, the survey measure might be contaminated by self-serving reports, or might not capture the concept that the researcher is interested in. This section first details both measures and then documents the alignment between the two measures in our linked administrative-survey data.
A. Administrative Data Measure
The standard approach in administrative data is to classify separations based on information from net worker flows. In particular, a large net contraction is taken as evidence of firm distress, and the event as a whole is referred to as a mass layoff. We follow the practice in this literature of defining a mass layoff as occurring when employment falls by 30 percent or more. Table A2 highlights the commonality across papers using administrative data of this definition, which originates with Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) . While this cutoff may seem arbitrary, the findings in this paper suggest that it does a reasonable job of mainly picking up separations that are caused by the employer contraction, in a sense that we develop more formally in Section IV.
We use a one-year window around when the worker separated to measure the employer growth rate. Specifically, we measure the firm's employment three quarters before the separation and one quarter after the separation. If the decline in employment over this period exceeds 30 percent, then we label this a mass layoff. This one-year time window is in line with recent literature, i.e., Andersson et al. (2014) and Davis and von Wachter (2011) . In contrast, Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) allow for a six year window.
In Appendix A we discuss other ways of measuring separations due to economic distress that have appeared in the literature.
B. Survey Data Measures
The SIPP provides information from workers about their perceptions of the circumstances surrounding the separation. Researchers typically use the worker-reported reasons from the survey to classify separations into those owing to economic distress at the firm, and other reasons.
Because of the multiple survey response options in the SIPP and the relatively small sample sizes, we classify the survey responses into three groups: distress, quit, and other. We map the following four reasons for separation to distress: (i) on layoff, 4 (ii) employer went bankrupt, (iii) employer sold business, and (iv) slack work or business conditions. To identify worker quits, we narrow in on the employer-to-employer transitions that are the subject of interest in the literature and thereby restrict to survey reports of "quit to take another job." Finally, we classify the remaining reasons for separation into an other category: (i) retirement or old age, (ii) other family/personal/child obligations, (iii) own illness/injury, (iv) school or training, (v) job was temporary and ended, (vi) unsatisfactory work arrangement, (vii) quit for some other reason, and (viii) discharged/fired. Other surveys that have been used to study displacements capture a slightly different combination of reasons. The most common surveys used are the DWS and the PSID, although other research has used the HRS, the NLSY, and the SIPP. Von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth (2012) compare the DWS with administrative records. Appendix Table A3 summarizes definitions of displacement that have been used in worker-side surveys.
C. Alignment of Survey and Administrative Measures
Using our aggregated survey categories, Table 1 shows that the survey and administrative measures are aligned, though not perfectly. For example, of the separations where workers report distress in the survey data, 28 percent occur during a mass layoff. In contrast, only 5 percent of workers reported quits, and 6 percent of workers reported other reasons, occurred during a mass layoff.
Even within the aggregated survey categories, the survey and administrative measures are correlated. All of the survey reasons we classify as other have lower shares of the mass layoff indicator than the survey reasons we classify as distress. Within the survey reasons we classify as distress, the fact that the employer went bankrupt/ sold business has the highest share of the mass layoff indicator also makes sense.
Despite this alignment between the survey and administrative measures, the administrative measure misses most of the separations that the survey respondents label as due to distress. Specifically, 28 percent of the worker survey-reported distress separations are captured by the administrative indicator such that the administrative indicator misses over 70 percent of the survey-reported distress separations.
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Panel B of Table 1 shows the misalignment in the other direction. Almost half of the separations that are labeled as an administrative displacement are labeled by workers as not due to distress. Among the administrative displacements, 55 percent of SIPP respondents report a job loss due to distress.
6 Thus, the majority of the the small share of workers who have earnings starting five quarters after separation from their pre-displacement employer. 5 Our results are close to von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth (2012) . Conditional on a survey report of a displacement, they find substantial variation in alignment depending on the precise administrative definition used. For their preferred administrative definition (row 8), they find that a displacement shows up in the administrative data 23 percent of the time given it is present in the survey data, while we find it for 28 percent of separations. Of course, if we focus attention on a narrow category of distress, "employer bankrupt or sold business," then the alignment is tighter. 6 Conditional on the administrative indicator, we find many more survey reports of distress using the SIPP than von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth (2012) finds using the DWS. In Table 4 , column 7, von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth (2012) , conditional on the firm-side indicator showing distress, finds a report of a displacement in the DWS at most 14 percent of the time (for various definitions of displacement). This contrasts to 55 percent in our data. The reason, we think, is that the DWS is notoriously plagued by recall bias.
separations that the administrative measure labels as a displacement correspond to a worker report of displacement, which confirms the finding reported in Davis and von Wachter (2011, 9) that "most employment reductions are achieved through layoffs when firms contract by 30 percent or more." 7 We now turn to graphical evidence on alignment between survey and administrative measures. Figure 1 shows how separations depend on the employer growth rate. In panel A, the solid line plots the probability of a worker separating as a function of the employer growth rate, while the histogram plots the distribution of the employer growth rates. 8 The histogram shows that for most observations in our data employers are relatively stable. The solid line displays the canonical hockey stick shape (Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger 2012, figure 6 ) whereby the probability of separating rises rapidly as employers contract.
Panel B of Figure 1 shows the graphical version of the imperfect alignment between survey and administrative indicators of displacement. The figure decomposes the probability of separating in panel A as a function of the employer growth rate into the three survey reasons: distress, quit, and other. Looking at the left-hand side of the graph, we see that among firms contracting by 30 percent or more there 7 The Davis and von Wachter (2011) statistic is based on the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), which is an employer-side survey. It is possible a firm reports laying a worker off, while a worker reports a quit, or other reasons for separation. 8 Looking at Table 1 , the quarterly separation rate is about 3.0 percent. This might appear low. Several features of our sample account for this fact. First, the SIPP respondents considered in this paper have relatively stable jobs because we condition on having a year of tenure. Second, the frequency of the table is quarterly. The implied annual separation rate is about 12 percent. are many survey reports of quit and other as the reason for separation. Moreover, as employers contract, the probabilities of each survey reason rises. Looking at the right-hand side, there is still a positive probability of worker's reporting distress as the reason for separation, even though the administrative data approach would suggest none. Table 2 reports a variety of robustness and extension to our main definitions.
D. Robustness and Extensions
We first consider varying our definition of mass layoff along the dimensions of severity and timing. As can be anticipated from panel B of Figure 1 , when we increase the severity to a 40 percent contraction, we find slightly tighter alignment; when we decrease to a 5 percent contraction, we find a weaker relationship. We also vary the timing. In our benchmark we use the growth rate computed over 4 quarters relative to the separation (from t − 3 to t + 1 ). We experiment with varying this to 8 quarters and 16 quarters and find, perhaps unsurprisingly, that alignment is much weaker when we use a wider time period to measure the contraction.
We then consider one of the alternative indicators of a displacement discussed in the Appendix: unemployment insurance (UI) take-up. UI take-up is potentially a cleaner indicator of a layoff because there is a legal sense in which the UI system ensures that the worker was laid off rather than was fired or quit. Using a survey-based measure of UI take-up is still potentially problematic. As Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009 Table 8 ) show, there is substantial underreporting of UI receipts in the SIPP. 9 We find that, conditional on reporting collecting UI, 66 percent of workers report separating because of distress, while 11 percent of workers who do not collect UI report separating because of distress.
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We also use the information in the SIPP on severance pay to help validate and interpret the survey responses. We find that, conditional on receiving severance pay, it is extremely unlikely that a worker reports a quit.
III. Earnings Changes Following a Separation
The prior section shows that survey and administrative indicators of displacement are imperfectly aligned. This section shows that the consequences of the separation depend on both the administrative and survey classifications. In Section IV, we look in more detail at the interaction between the classifications.
A. Earnings Specification
We estimate the "treatment" effect of several different classes of separations on labor market outcomes in an event study framework. The event study framework was pioneered by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) to study the effect of displacements. We also use it to study earnings changes following any separation. This comparison allows us to difference out earnings gains (or losses) that would have happened in the absence of the separation. For notational simplicity, we refer to displaced workers as the treated group in this section.
Consider a treated group of workers who lose their job in a displacement in a particular event quarter y (say 2000:I), and a control group of workers who do not lose their jobs in that quarter and were employed at a firm that was relatively stable Table 1 . The first panel reports the main results. The second and third panels explore sensitivity to the severity of the contraction to define the mass layoff indicator. The benchmark contraction is 30 percent. The second panel uses a 40 percent contraction, while the third panel uses a 5 percent contraction. The fourth and fifth panels explore sensitivity to the timing of the contraction. The benchmark uses four quarters to compute the growth rate to define the mass layoff indicator (from t − 3 to t + 1 for a separation in quarter t). The fourth panel uses 8 quarters, while the fifth panel uses 16 quarters. The sixth panel defines an indicator based on whether the worker reported collecting unemployment insurance (UI) in the SIPP in the nine months following the separation. The seventh panel defines an indicator based on whether in the SIPP the worker reported receiving severance pay. The eighth panel reports the benchmark alignment using the 2008 SIPP panel.
Source: SIPP-LEHD as explained in text.
(i.e., did not growth or shrink). Following Davis and von Wachter (2011, equation 1), we specify the regression
where e it y is real earnings of individual i in quarter t , α i y are worker fixed effects, γ t y are calendar-quarter fixed effects, X → it is a quartic polynomial in the age of worker i in year t , the D it k are dummy variables equal to 1 in the k th quarter relative to the displacement, and u it y represents random factors. In this specification, the inclusion of the calendar time dummies, the γ t y , means that the δ k y measure the earnings path of the time y displaced workers relative to the continuers at the stationary firms. We normalize δ −3 y = 0.
11 The δ k y are the coefficients of interest: the effect of being displaced relative to continuing at a stationary firm in the particular quarter.
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In our SIPP-LEHD matched data, we have a relatively small number of separators per quarter, so we pool across quarters by stacking datasets corresponding to each of the quarter-specific experiments reflected in equation (1). Specifically, this means keeping only 3 quarters of workers earnings prior to each event quarter and 16 quarters of earnings after the event quarter.
13 Letting y represent a displacement or event quarter and recognizing that t = k + y , we have
Relative to equation (1), this specification imposes 3 restrictions. First, the effect of displacement on earnings does not vary across displacement quarters so that δ k y = δ k . Second, the slope of the path of the earnings of the control group is constant across displacement quarters, up to a level shift. That is, rather than entering
, where E it k ′ is an indicator for the displacement quarter.
14 We also normalize δ −3 = 0 . 15 Third, the age-earnings profile does not differ across displacement quarter so that β y = β . 16 Online Appendix D discusses several issues with how to compute standard errors for this pooled specification and how we address them.
The sample described above includes the person-quarters in the SIPP that we successfully match to the LEHD. That match requires that we observe LEHD earnings in the current and previous three quarters. To study outcomes subsequent to displacement events, we need to include LEHD earnings for subsequent quarters. As is standard in the literature (see Appendix Table A1 ), we initially restrict to the sample of people with positive earnings in a calendar year for up to four years after the displacement. We allow for less than four years when the LEHD data "runs out" (e.g., for a separation in 2006, we only require positive earnings in 2006, 2007, and 2008) . We discuss this sample restriction in detail in Section V.
As our primary earnings variable, we normalize earnings using the average of two quarters of workers' earnings prior to displacement. To be precise, if the last quarter of the employment relationship is period t = 0 , then we use the average earnings in periods t − 1 and t − 2 . Using earnings normalized in this way combines the strengths of the levels and logs specification. Like the levels specification, it allows us to include quarters in which a worker had zero earnings. Like the logs specification, it generates coefficient estimates that are interpretable as percent change in earnings relative to pre-displacement earnings. In addition, like the log specification, it weights each worker equally. We are not the first to construct normalized earnings in this way; see, for example, Autor et al. (2014) and Davis and von Wachter (2011) .
B. Comparison Groups
In contrast to a common control group, in which all workers who continue in their jobs constitute the control group (see Krolikowski (2018) for further discussion), our control group in equation (2) is workers who continue at relatively stable firms (which we define as firm growth in the growth interval [−5 percent, +5 percent] ).
17 The language of treatment and control implies that we presume that the data approximates an experiment where some workers randomly separate. An empirical implication of random separations is that the two groups look similar on observable covariates. Table 3 shows that there are important differences in observable characteristics between our treatment and control groups. The mass layoff separators are younger, have less education, are more likely to be men, and earn less.
18 They also work in smaller firms and in more blue collar industries.
To address this lack of covariate balance, we turn to propensity score reweighting. The basic idea of propensity score reweighting is to make the control group "look like" the treatment group. Complete details are in online Appendix E. Notes: This table reports differences in observable characteristics between the administratively defined mass layoff separators to the control group of continuers at stationary firms. Column 1 reports differences in population shares. Within each broad category, the differences thus sum to zero. Column 2 reports differences in the population shares after having re-weighted the control group to look like the mass layoff separators.
Source: SIPP-LEHD as explained in text C. Displaced Worker Earnings Losses: Weighted and Unweighted
Panel A of Figure 2 shows that there are large earnings losses immediately after an administrative displacement. The figure plots the earnings trajectories of workers from 3 quarters before to 16 quarters after the separation. While there is a recovery, even three to four years after the displacement, earnings are still lower. This persistence replicates the standard result in the literature. The level of the long-term earnings losses are lower than in some classic studies such as Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) . We suspect that this difference is because we impose a lower tenure requirement (one year, as opposed to six years in Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993) .
Panel B shows that our reweighting procedure makes little difference to the estimated earnings trajectory. Given the large differences in observable characteristics documented in Table 3 and the fact that the reweighting procedure generates balance (see column 2), this finding might seem surprising. It should not be surprising for a combination of three reasons. First, we have already included worker fixed effects in the estimation, so that level differences in earnings predicted by these characteristics are removed. Second, we include a quartic polynomial in age so that age differences between the two groups-the primary predictor of curvature in earnings-is controlled for in the specification. Finally, we have verified that while re-weighting the control group does increase the mean earnings growth in this group, this increase is small relative to displaced worker earnings losses. For the remainder of the results in the paper, we find that there are differences in observable characteristics between our "treatment" and "control" groups, but that re-weighting makes no difference to our estimates. Hence, we present the re-weighted results and do not discuss differences in observable characteristics across groups.
D. Decomposing the Administrative Measure by Survey Reason
Among those identified as displaced by the administrative indicator, there is significant heterogeneity in the earnings changes based on the survey reason. Figure 3 plots the earnings changes for the administratively indicated displaced workers (as in Figure 2 ), but split into the three survey categories. Mechanically, the lines in this figure come from estimating three separate regressions of the form given in equation (2). Those reporting a distress reason for separation experience large initial drops in earnings and then a gradual recovery. Indeed, the recovery is slightly steeper among the survey distress in an administrative displacement than in the administrative displacement overall. The earnings trajectory of the other separations are similar to the distress, except that the earnings recovery fades out more than three years past the separation. Such substantial earnings losses for this group should not come as a surprise given the fact that many of the survey reports (i.e., retirement, other family obligations, etc.) have implications for subsequent labor market status. In contrast, those reporting a quit experience modest earnings gains relative to the control group.
This heterogeneity in earnings losses across survey reasons provides evidence that noise in the survey responses does not explain why the administrative and survey measures of displacement are imperfectly aligned. Specifically, that the quits do much better than the remaining two survey reasons is consistent with these workers having a very different experience of the mass layoff. The next section takes up the question of how to interpret this heterogeneity in earnings changes by survey report.
IV. Recovering Earnings Losses of a Latent Displacement
In this section, we develop and implement a method to measure the earnings losses of the separations that are caused by the employer contraction. To do so, we combine the information in Section II and III. Section II showed that the survey data and administrative data do not always agree on the reason for separation. Section III showed that the consequences of an administratively indicated mass layoff differ depending on the worker survey report. Now we use these differences to measure latent earnings losses.
Our approach uses the survey data to help interpret the administrative indicator of displacement. Hence, we treat the administrative and survey reports asymmetrically. An alternative approach would treat administrative and survey measures symmetrically, view them both as noisy measures of the same underlying phenomenon, and use one as an instrument for the other. These two approaches answer different faster earnings growth, re-weighting the control group increases the rate of earnings growth, though this effect is quantitatively small. questions. Using the survey measure as an instrument for the administrative measure answers the question, "what are the effects of separations that survey and administrative data agree are due to firm distress?" Our approach answers the question, "what are the effects of the separations that are caused by the firm contracting, and how does that differ by survey reason?" The reason we pursue our approach is that the administrative data approach is the benchmark in the literature, so we seek to supplement it with information in the survey data. Moreover, our approach provides a natural way of combining the descriptive results in the previous two sections.
A. Overview
Panel B of Figure 1 plots the probability of reporting each kind of separation as a function of employer growth rates. It shows that the probability of reporting all kinds of separations rises rapidly as the employer contracts. If we assume that the underlying propensities of individuals to separate for a particular reason is independent of the firm growth rates, then the fact that the quit, distress, and other probabilities rise as the firm contracts suggests that many of these separations are caused by the firm contraction. The next section formalizes this logic and shows how to use this assumption to also learn about the earnings changes caused by the employer contraction. Sorkin (2018) uses similar reasoning to probabilistically distinguish 
B. Methodology for Identifying Latent Displacements and Its Consequences
We are interested in estimating the effects of a separation in a mass layoff that is due to economic distress, which we call a latent displacement and denote by ML ⁎ . Note that ML ⁎ differs from separations observed in mass layoff (or ML ) in that it only contains the separations that are caused by the employer contraction, and not merely coincident with it. We allow the possibility that separations associated with any worker-survey response, distress, quit, or other, are a latent displacement.
We now define some notation. Let s be a particular survey reason for separation, s ∈ {distress, quit, other} . In a slight abuse of notation, we will use ML s and ML s * to refer to separations in an observed mass layoff based on administrative data (ML s ) or a latent displacement (ML s * ) indexed by the worker's report of a particular survey reason. Let Δ earn k be the earnings change in a particular displacement time ( δ k from Section III). Define ω s to be the reported share of survey reason s in a mass layoff, while ω s ⁎ is the latent share. The standard earnings loss regression is the linear least squares projection corresponding to
We are instead interested in
Comparing equations (3) and (4) reveals two reasons why the earnings losses caused by the contraction might differ from the benchmark results. First, the shares might differ. For example, it might be that the benchmark approach overstates the share of quits that are caused by the contraction and so leads to an underestimate of earnings losses. Second, the earnings changes might differ. For example, it might be that quits that are caused by the mass layoff have very different earnings changes than the quits that would have happened anyway. To estimate the 피[ Δ earn k | ML s ⁎ = 1] , consider the following pointwise relationship (i.e., for all k from Section III):
where π s = Pr( ML s * | ML) is the probability that a separation and survey response is caused by the firm-level contraction. Below, we use the notation Pr( not ML s * | ML) = 1 − π s to refer to the ML separations that are not caused by the mass layoff. This equation says that observed earnings changes given a mass layoff and a survey response are a mix of workers who separate because of the mass layoff and workers who would have separated anyway. To estimate the ω s * , we use the following relationship:
This equation says that the latent shares differ from the observed shares to the extent that survey responses differ in how likely they are to be causally related to the employer contraction. For example, we find that survey reports of distress are more likely to be caused by the contraction than survey reports of quits. Let RS s be notation that we use analogously to ML s to refer to separations in the relatively stable region of employer growth. Our identifying assumptions follow.
Assumption 1 says that we can estimate the probability that a separation would have happened regardless of what was going on at the firm by looking at the separation probability in the relatively stable region. Assumption 2 says that we can estimate the earnings losses of the separations that would have happened in the absence of the firm-level contraction by looking at the earnings losses of those who separate in the relatively stable region. Assumption 1 allows us to estimate the probability a separation was caused by the contraction by the excess probability of separation when the employer contracts relative to the relatively stable region:
We then rearrange equation (5) and substitute in for our various assumptions to have
This equation shows that two things have to be true for the earnings losses in latent displacements, ML s * , to differ from those in the observed displacement, ML . First, there needs to be a difference between ML s * and ML s , formally, π s < 1 . Second, the earnings losses in ML s need to differ from the earnings losses in the relatively stable region, formally,
As an example of the calculation in equation (5), suppose that the average quit leads to a gain of $10. Suppose that a quit at a contracting employer leads to a gain of $5 and that 50 percent of these are excess quits. Then we infer that these extra quits had a gain of $0, since 0.5 × 10 + 0.5 × 0 = $5, where the 0 on the left-hand side is the unknown quantity that we solve for.
Performing the calculations in equations (7) and (8) allows us to use equation (4) to estimate the object of interest.
C. Probabilities and Shares
The probability of separation for all survey-reported reasons is much higher when firms undergo large contractions than when they are relatively stable. Rows 1 and 2 of Table 4 contain the numerical version of the differences evidence in Figure 1 . 21 Converting to the probability that the separations are caused by the employer contraction using equation (7), row 3 of Table 4 shows that the distress separations have a much stronger causal connection to firm growth than the quit and other separations. Specifically, 96 percent of the distress separations are caused by the firm contraction, while only 77 percent of the other separations and 67 percent of the 21 Summing across the three categories in row 1, we find a total separation probability of 0.102. Given that the definition of a mass layoff is that the firm is contracting by 30 percent or more, some readers might wonder how to reconcile these two facts. The reconciliation lies in the fact that the workers in our sample are the higher-tenure subset of the workers at the firms. For each survey reported reason of separation, the first two rows record the probabilities of separation conditional on an administratively defined mass layoff (1) or when the firm is growing by between −5 percent and +5 percent (relatively stable) (2). The third row converts these conditional probabilities to estimates that each separation was caused by the employer contraction, using equation (7). Rows 4 and 5 show the shares of each survey identified reason for separation in constructing the aggregate earnings changes. The table reports these probabilities based on the re-weighted samples detailed in Table 3 ; see online Appendix Table E1 for the unweighted version of panel A.
Source: SIPP-LEHD as explained in text.
quit separations are caused by the firm contraction. This finding is consistent with the intuition that even at relatively stable firms, workers are likely to be quitting (or separating for other reasons), and so many of these quits and other separations would have happened anyway. These different probabilities by survey reason alter the weights placed on different categories of survey separation when computing earnings losses caused by the contraction. The bottom two rows of Table 4 show the shares used in equations (3) and (4) to aggregate the earnings changes by category. As can be anticipated from the different probabilities, this procedure means that we place more weight on the distress separation and less weight on the quit and other separations.
It is helpful to contrast our approach to an approach that would take the survey data at face value. In particular, if we were to take the survey data at face value and only treat events where the survey and administrative data agree as a latent displacement, then from row 1 of Table 4 , we would conclude that only 
D. Earnings Losses Caused by the Contraction
We now compute the earnings losses for each of the three survey reasons for separation that are caused by the contraction.
Panel A of Figure 4 considers the distress survey reason. It plots the earnings components of equation (8). The red dashed line reproduces the solid red line from Figure 3 , which measures the earnings changes of workers separating in administratively indicated displacement, where the survey reason is also distress. The blue line reports the earnings changes where in the administrative data the firm is relatively stable, but the worker's survey reason is distress. Significantly, workers reporting distress have better post-displacement earnings outcomes during a mass layoff than when the firm is relatively stable. This finding supports the adverse selection logic of Gibbons and Katz (1991) that workers who perceive distress as the reason for the separation do better when there are many workers leaving the firm and there is less scope for selection. The black solid line combines the blue line and red line to recover the latent earnings loss caused by the firm contraction. It is remarkably similar to the red dashed line of all the distress responses in a mass layoff. The reason is that we estimate that 96 percent of the survey-reported distress separations in a mass layoff are caused by the firm contraction, and so the latent earnings loss places almost all weight on the ML earnings loss.
Panel B of Figure 4 considers the quit survey reason. The red dashed line-the ML line-reproduces the blue line from Figure 3 , which measures the earnings 22 There is rounding that explains the difference from the 85 percent one gets if one does the calculation directly. changes of workers separating in administratively indicated mass layoff where the survey reason is quit. The blue line reports the earnings changes where in the administrative data the firm is relatively stable, but the worker's survey reason is quit. The black line shows that the estimated earnings changes of the quits caused by the mass layoff (ML quit * ) are worse than that measured from looking at the quit separations in mass layoffs directly (ML quit ). The reason is that the earnings gains to quits when the firm is relatively stable are much bigger than the earnings gains to quits when the firm is contracting. Since we estimate that about a third of the quits in the mass layoff are reaping these larger gains, the quits caused by the mass layoff must have worse outcomes. Nevertheless, the difference between ML quit and ML quit * is not very big-at most a few percentage points. (2), where the "treatment" group is separators who report a given survey reason when the firm is contracting by 30 percent or more (ML) and when the firm is growing by between −5 percent and +5 percent (no growth). The two lines are then combined pointwise to form the ML: latent line using equation (8) and information in Table 4 . The units on the y-axis are fraction of pre-displacement earnings, where the pre-displacement earnings are normalized to one.
Source: SIPP-LEHD as explained in text.
Quarters relative to displacement Finally, using equation (4), Figure 5 aggregates the latent measures across survey categories depicted in Figure 4 using the weights in Table 4 to measure the earnings losses of the separations caused by the firm contraction. The figure also reproduces the benchmark results from Figure 2 . The earnings losses from the simple administrative-based measure are remarkably close to the earnings losses of the separations caused by the firm contraction.
Why are the observed earnings losses in a mass layoff (ML) so similar to the latent earnings losses (ML * )? Two surprising features of the data drive this result. First, the sharp rise in the probability of all the survey reasons as employment declines in Figure 1 means that there is a large difference between proximate reasons reported by workers at contracting firms and the ultimate reason for their separation. As a Figure 4 and the shares in Table 4 . The aggregated line is constructed using equation (3). Online Appendix Figure E1 compares the aggregated line in this figure to the single specification version in Figure 2 . The units on the y-axis are fraction of pre-displacement earnings, where the pre-displacement earnings are normalized to one.
result, the weights in equation (8) are quite high, and so the first condition necessary for ML and ML * to differ is also not found in the data ( π s is close to 1 ). Second, conditional on the survey reason, what is going on at the firm-whether it is contracting by a lot, or is relatively stable-does not have a large effect on earnings losses:
. This means that the second condition necessary for the latent and observed measures to differ emphasized in equation (8) is not met.
In summary, the standard practice of using observed ML for overall earnings losses is not misleading, which is reassuring for the literature. Nonetheless, knowledge of the worker reason does contain important information about the consequences of the separation for workers' future labor market outcomes. In terms of earnings losses, we uncover substantial heterogeneity depending on survey responses and the administrative data categories. Yet, conditional on the survey reason for separation, the differences in earnings loss estimates between firms that are contracting and firms that are stable are small. This results in an estimate of the latent earnings losses of displaced workers that is quite similar to the estimate using administrative data alone. Hence, although we find evidence of sources of potential bias, they are quantitatively small and, to an extent, cancel out.
E. Implications for the Cyclicality of Earnings Losses
Using administrative data, Davis and von Wachter (2011) emphasize the cyclicality of the earnings losses of displaced workers: workers displaced in recessions experience larger earnings losses than workers displaced in booms. Our framework highlights one mechanism that contributes to this finding. In a recession, the administrative displacements, ML, are more likely to be latent displacements, ML * . Mechanically, the reason is that in recessions labor markets are worse, and so workers are less likely to be able to find jobs in anticipation of a displacement and so less likely to have a survey report of quit, which is associated with better outcomes.
To document evidence of this, we extend our previous analysis and link the 2008 SIPP panel to the LEHD. This allows us to contrast the relationship between survey and administrative reports in the 2000s and in the Great Recession. 23 The bottom panel of Table 2 shows that in the recession, the alignment between the survey and administrative measures is tighter than in our benchmark estimates. The bottom panel of Table 4 shows that the "distress" separations make up a greater share of the latent mass layoff separations in the recession than in our benchmark estimates. This evidence is consistent with Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2012) in that in a recession, fewer of the separations when firms contract are survey-reported quits.
To ask about the quantitative importance of this mechanism, we apply the Great Recession weights to our estimates. The reason we just change the weights is that conceptually, many things change in a recession (i.e., the consequences of each type of separation), and we want to focus on the changes in earnings losses that are due solely to the changing composition. 24 Hence, mechanically, we take weights from the bottom panel of Table 4 , and apply them to the earnings losses displayed in Figure 4 . Figure 6 displays the results.
Aggregating, we find that in our data and sample period, the changing composition of job separations in administratively measured displacements can account for very little of the cyclicality of earnings losses. Why is this? While panel B of Table 4 shows that the weight shifts from quit to distress, which generates larger earnings losses, the weight also shifts from other to distress, which generates smaller earnings losses. This of course leaves plenty of room for complementary explanations, such as that in Huckfeldt (2016) .
V. The Role of Zeros in Earnings Losses
Having used survey data to sort out the reasons for separations, we now turn to using the survey data to understand the labor market outcomes subsequent to the separation. As it turns out, the information in survey data about these labor market 24 As discussed in footnote 23, we also do not have a long enough span of data to estimate earnings losses in the Great Recession. Table 4 , panels A and B), applied to the earnings losses in Figure 4 .
outcomes makes a striking difference for understanding labor market outcomes after a true displacement.
A. Zeros: Unemployed or Out of the Labor Force?
A common practice in estimating displaced worker earnings losses is to exclude earnings histories when a worker exhibits long spells of zero earnings following the separation (see Appendix Table A1 ). The reason is that in administrative data, it is hard to know whether the zero earnings represent periods of being out of the labor force or periods of looking for work. If we could distinguish between these reasons, however, we might want to include the zero earnings associated with looking for work because these losses represent an extreme reduction in hours following the displacement. In contrast, we might not want to include zeros associated with being out of the labor force because this state is fundamentally different. So far in this paper we have followed the standard practice of omitting all earnings histories with a calendar year of zeros in the four years following the separation.
Our link with survey data provides information on whether the zero earning histories that we omit in our benchmark specification represent workers who are out of the labor force or are looking for work. We study the set of workers who have at least Source: SIPP-LEHD as explained in text one calendar year of zeros following displacement (this is the earnings filter used by Sullivan 1993 and Couch and Placzek 2010 , among others; see Appendix Table A1 ).
Panel A of Table 5 shows that over 40 percent of separators have 0 earnings in a calendar year following the separations and are thus omitted from the analysis of earnings losses in Section IIIA. Most-70 percent-of the separations that our zeros screen eliminates reported other as the survey reason for separation. This finding is intuitive since the other category contains many reasons for separation that are correlated with leaving the labor force.
Panel B of Table 5 looks at the activities of the workers in panel A in the calendar year in which they have zero earnings. We report all activities that the worker reports in the SIPP in that calendar year, and so some workers report multiple activities. The table shows that workers reporting firm distress are more likely to remain in the labor force than workers who lose their jobs for other reasons. Forty percent of separations citing firm distress report looking for work, while this share is only 6 percent for the other categories.
Panel C of Table 5 demonstrates that these survey responses predict different subsequent labor market outcomes. We aggregate the activities in panel B across the survey reasons for separation. In the spirit of Flinn and Heckman (1983) , we consider whether workers reporting their activity as "looking for work" (which most closely corresponds to the CPS notion of unemployed) are more likely to subsequently find a job than workers reporting the other categories of activities. The bottom panel of Table 5 reports the probability of having positive earnings at any point in the next eight quarters as a function of the activities reported by the workers. Consistent with the informative nature of the survey responses, the highest probability of nonzero earnings is among workers reporting "looking for work" and "employed."
B. The Role of Zeros in Earnings Losses
To assess the role of zero-earnings in the measurement of post-displacement earnings, we create two additional samples besides our benchmark sample of workers who are consistently employed (no zeros). The two alternative samples are:
• add back in the workers with earnings histories with zero earnings that are dropped by our zeros screen whether it looks like they are unemployed or out of the labor force (all zeros); and • include only workers with earnings histories with zero earnings that identify in the SIPP that they are looking for work in the four quarters following the separation and thus would be classified as unemployed (some zeros).
Panel A of Figure 7 reproduces the finding (e.g., Davis and von Wachter 2011) that there are large differences in earnings losses depending on the two treatments of zeros that are available to researchers using only administrative data. The no zeros line shows the standard treatment of zeros. The all zeros line includes "all" zeros; i.e., it includes workers who are out of the labor force and unemployed. The difference between these two lines is about 15 percentage points of pre-displacement earnings. Typical analysis of displaced worker earnings losses would stop there and leave it to the reader to make up their minds which line they preferred.
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Our use of survey data allows us to add back in only the earnings histories of workers who stay in the labor force following the displacement. The red dashed 25 Online Appendix Figure E2 shows the results of two alternative zeros filters. The first filter drops all quarters in which there are zero earnings. The second filter drops all earnings histories in which there are ever quarters of zeros. line in panel A of Figure 7 shows that doing this-the some zeros line-results in earnings losses that are about halfway between the two extreme treatments of zeros. That is, many displaced workers continue to look for work but have significant spells of no earnings following their separation. Relative to the typical treatment of dropping the zeros, adding in these zeros approximately doubles the long-term earnings losses. Panels B to D in Figure 7 show that these workers who are unemployed following the displacement are exclusively those who report distress. In panel B, which focuses on workers who report distress, almost all of the workers with zeros are unemployed and so the some zeros line is close to the all zeros line. In contrast, for the quit and other survey reasons the workers with zeros are almost all out of the labor force, so the some zeros line is very close to the no zeros line. Table 5 shows that despite these being quarters with zero administrative data earnings, many workers report being employed. Among the quits, 89 percent of workers report being employed, while this number is only 30 percent among those who separated due to distress. An obvious explanation is that, while our administrative data covers a large majority of the workforce, it is still possible for an individual to transition to a job not covered by the data. In particular, more informal employment arrangements, such as working for a family member, might not report to the UI system. Additionally, our version of the LEHD does not contain federal government employment. Table 6 shows that working for government or family members is less common among workers who separated due to distress than other separations. The table investigates workers who report being employed in the survey, but for whom the administrative data records zero earnings. Part-time work is another kind of employment that might be less likely to be covered and/or reported to the UI system. We find substantial amounts of part-time work among the zeros (34 percent among those citing firm distress). Finally, the table indicates that the survey reported earnings are low. Conditional on positive earnings in the SIPP, the mean level of earnings is around $4,500 a quarter among workers separating due to distress.
C. Employment among False Zeros
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VI. Conclusion
This paper studies why workers separate from their jobs and how the consequences of these separations depend on the reason. Specifically, we look at workers who are labelled displaced using the standard administrative data approach, and ask what these workers say about why they separated. Almost half of such workers report reasons other than firm distress, including a large share (about 20 percent) who report quitting to take another job. Similarly, at firms that administrative data would indicate are doing fine, we find evidence that workers separate and give a survey reason of displacement.
We also find that even given the administrative data indicator, there is significant heterogeneity in the consequences of the separations that depends on the survey reason. For example, the workers who report quit in an administrative mass layoff experience earnings gains relative to the control group of non-separators.
Surprisingly, this heterogeneity in earnings losses by survey reason, conditional on the administrative data distress indicator, is larger than the heterogeneity in the other direction. That is, conditional on the survey reason, what is going on at the firm does not have a large impact on the earnings changes of workers.
What the administrative indicator does do, however, is shift the composition of separations. Not surprisingly, survey reports of distress account for a much greater share of separations at the mass layoff firms than at the relatively stable firms. Even though the composition of separations shifts, it is still the case that the probability of separating and reporting non-distress survey reasons rise dramatically when the employer contracts.
We then develop a method to combine the information in the survey and administrative data and measure the consequences of the separations that were ultimately caused by the firm contraction. We find that the earnings consequences of the separations ultimately caused by the employer contraction are quite similar to those captured by the standard administrative measure. Two intermediate results drive this finding. First, because the probability of all types of separations rises dramatically, most of the separations in the administratively indicated mass layoff are caused by the mass layoff. Second, the earnings changes associated with each survey report do not depend that much on the state of the employer. Indeed, the result of our method is to increase the alignment of the administrative measure with survey displacement from 54 percent in the raw data to about 85 percent.
Additionally, we use the combination of administrative and survey data to shed light on the conceptually distinct issue of how to treat displaced workers with Table 5 .) The first two rows record the percentage of these SIPP respondents reporting work in either government/family or part-time circumstances. The last rows report the share of these respondents recording positive earnings in the SIPP, and the average value of those SIPP-based earnings.
persistent zero earnings. The standard practice in the displaced worker literature is to exclude observations with long stretches of zero earnings. Using the survey data, we can distinguish whether these zero earning individuals were looking for work or not. Including those who were looking for work approximately doubles the estimate of long-term earnings losses following a displacement. More generally, this paper has demonstrated the usefulness of combining administrative and survey measures of the same outcome. Administrative data are attractive because they provide precise measures of outcomes, often on very large samples. The reason for the outcomes, however, must typically be inferred in the administrative data. The linked survey data provide worker-level information on the reason for the outcomes. Our results show that the standard practice of using a mass layoff indicator in administrative data leads to estimates of earnings losses very similar to the approach proposed in this paper that combines survey and administrative measures.
Appendix A: Alternative Ways of Identifying Economic Distress
The literature and some government programs contain other ways of attempting to measure separations due to firm distress.
A. Government Programs
Some US federal government programs use definitions of mass displacements. These definitions are also displayed in Table A2 . In general, these definitions focus on the number of separations (e.g., 50 or more worker separations), rather than the change in employer size (e.g., 30 percent contraction) as in the definitions in the economics literature. The BLS Mass Layoff definition has been used in academic research (e.g., Ananat et al. 2011) . The BLS Mass Layoff Program has been discontinued due to budget cuts, which serves to reinforce the value of alternative measures of displacements in administrative data.
B. Unemployment Insurance
While UI collection is not commonly used to measure the nature of worker separations, both Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) and Couch and Placzek (2010) report estimates of long-term earnings losses on the subset of workers who collect UI. Some papers also use unconditional UI collection as a measure of displacement: Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (2005) and Hilger (2016) , which uses state UI records and tax records, respectively. The goal of this measurement is to isolate separations that are not due to workers being fired for cause. A disadvantage of this approach, however, is that it conditions on future outcomes since it selects those workers who do not find jobs immediately.
C. Media Reports
A final alternative measure worth noting is one based on what the media covers as mass layoffs. Hallock (1998) is an outstanding example of this approach. 27 He looks at media reports of mass layoffs at public companies from 1987 to 1995. 28 An interesting feature of this data is that these layoffs are small compared to that reflected in economic studies. Chen et al. (2001, Hallock (1998) for 1990 to 1995 and report that the average share of the workforce involved in a layoff identified in this matter is 8.74 percent, while the median is 4.55 percent. One interpretation of this fact is that even though a large number of separations is required to attract media attention, public companies are large, so this makes up a small share of their size. Appendices B through E are available online.
27 See Farber and Hallock (2009) for additional references. 28 He searches the Wall Street Journal for article abstracts containing the following words: layoff, laid off, downsize, plant closing, or downsizing. Schoeni and Dardia (1996) California UI records (1989:I-1994:III) All workers employed in aerospace in 1989:I (all ages, tenure, and men and women); positive earnings in each calendar year in the dataset; Bowlus and Vilhuber (2002 ) LEHD (1990 -1999 Full quarter employment four quarters before displacement, continually employed until displacement; in full quarter employment four quarters after the displacement (implicitly no zeros); five years of experience; men Lengermann and Vilhuber (2002 ) Maryland (1985 :II-1997 Full-quarter employment; all workers; zeros unclear (some specifications in logs) Dustmann and Meghir (2005) German (1974 -1986) In 1979, 50 or more employees; employment in year following the separation is 30 percent below 1970's peak; Schoeni and Dardia (1996) CA UI records (1989 ( :I-1994 In 1989:I, 50 or more employees; 1994:III employment is less than 1989:I employment Bowlus and Vilhuber (2002 ) LEHD (1990 -1999 Average from 1990 -1999 is 50 or more employees; number of separators from t − 1 to t (quarters) is at least 30 percent of average employment Lengermann and Vilhuber (2002 ) Maryland (1985 :II-1997 for period they are in the data, employer averages 25 or more employees; drop in employment of 30 percent from one quarter to next Dustmann and Meghir (2005) German Soc. Sec. Establishment closing LEHD Reduction in employment from quarter to quarter is at least 30 percent of max employment from 1992 to 1997; fewer than 80 percent of workers move to a common other employer Couch and Placzek (2010) Connecticut UI records Employer has 50 or more employees (not sure on when); separate within a year (before or after) of a 30 percent drop in employment below maximum employment from 1993 to 1998 Davis and von Wachter (2011) US Social Security records A separation in year t (positive earnings in t − 1 and 0 earnings in t) is a mass displacement if: (i) employment in t − 2 is greater than 50; (ii) employment in t is between 1 percent and 70 percent of period t − 2 employment; (iii) employment in t − 2 is less than 130 percent of t − 3 employment; (iv) employment in t + 1 is less than 90 percent of t − 2 employment Andersson et al. (2014) LEHD ≥25 workers in quarter t and a 4-quarter contraction of ≥30 percent von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth (2012) CA UI Records (1990 Records ( -2000 In 1990:I, 50 or more employees; 30 percent contraction below maximum level at the beginning of the sample period; [robustness exercises with quarter to quarter drops, and plant closings] Flaaen, Shapiro, and Sorkin (2019) [this paper] LEHD 50 or more workers in quarter t − 3 and a 4-quarter contraction of 30 percent, or a 4 quarter gross flow measure of 20 percent or less
Government programs Definition
Mass layoff program 50 or more workers filing for unemployment insurance and not recalled within 31 days; at state UI account level Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) 50-499 workers laid off when laid-off workers are at least 33 percent of the workforce; or all layoffs involving 500 or more workers at a physical location 
